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“[H]e who by his language or conduct leads another to do what
he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such
person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon
which he acted.”1
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situation: A longtime employee at a nearby
manufacturing plant receives a written pension benefit statement
from his longtime employer.2 The statement clearly provides that
after his many years of loyal service to the company, the employee
is eligible for early retirement when he turns sixty and, upon his
early retirement, will receive a monthly pension benefit of $3,000.
The employee, unable to verify the $3,000 figure on his own due
to the complexity of the benefits calculation,3 contacts his employer
to confirm the figure. On multiple occasions over the course of
several months, the employer confirms the $3,000 figure to the
employee in both written statements and in telephone conversa-
tions.
On his sixtieth birthday, the employee, tired after decades of
work, anxious to enter a new phase of life, and confident that his
pension will be sufficient to care for him and his wife in their re-
maining years, finally accepts early retirement. This scenario is
common in the United States, where the pension has long been
considered the final reward of the American Dream.4 But what
happens next is a nightmare. 
Just a few short months after the employee and his wife retire,
the employee receives a letter in the mail from his former employer.
The letter states that the employer miscalculated the employee’s
monthly pension benefit. Although the employee would have been
1. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879).
2. For the purposes of this Note, the terms “pension benefit statement” and “summary
plan description” are used interchangeably.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 129-32 (discussing the complicated nature of
pension benefits calculations).
4. Victoria M. Cosentino, The Illinois State Pension Crisis: Secure Retirement for Public
Servants at Risk, DUPAGE COUNTY BAR ASS’N BRIEF, Nov. 2006, at 18, 18 (“It was part of the
American Dream, a pledge made by corporations to their workers: for your decades of toil, you
will be assured of retirement benefits like a pension and health care.”).
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eligible to receive a $3,000 monthly benefit if he had retired at age
sixty-five, because he retired at age sixty, his actual monthly benefit
is a mere $900 per month. The letter then informs the employee
that he will no longer receive the $3,000 check every month and
demands that the employee repay the employer for the previous
months’ overpayments.5
The letter closes with a brief apology from the employer for “any
inconvenience this may have caused” the employee, but the apology
offers little consolation. The employee and his wife are out of work,
and the $900 monthly pension benefit is not nearly enough to cover
the car payment, groceries, and utilities, let alone their medications.
Even worse, neither can find a new job because no employer wants
to hire a sixty-year-old disgruntled worker. Because the pension is
not enough to live on, however, they have no choice but to look for
new work. 
One might think that the employee and his wife—a beneficiary to
the pension—could bring suit in state court under any number of
contract or tort causes of action, but the employee’s remedies are
actually much more limited. The employee’s claims are governed by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),6 which
preempts all state law causes of action, including all tort and
contract claims,7  and severely limits the legal remedies available
to the employee.8 The only way the employee can recover the
$3,000 monthly benefit is if he brings an estoppel claim against
his employer to prevent the employer from asserting that the
$3,000 monthly benefit conflicts with the actual pension plan.
Unfortunately, however, most federal courts permit ERISA estoppel
claims only under the most narrow of circumstances and would not
5. An employer or pension administrator who overpays a pension benefit may recoup the
amount overpaid from the pension recipient. See 29 C.F.R. § 4022.82 (2011) (discussing the
proper methods of recoupment for overpayments of pension benefits).
6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006) (“[T]he provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws in so far as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan.”).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (listing the exclusive set of remedies available to pension
participants and beneficiaries under ERISA).
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permit this employee’s claim.9 Unless these narrow ERISA estoppel
formulations change, the employee has no recourse.10
The specific facts of this scenario are loosely based on several
cases in which the courts denied the plaintiff-employees’ ERISA
estoppel claims,11 so it should be disconcerting that such a result
could occur to the 114 million Americans covered by ERISA plans.12
Because pension benefit calculation errors are relatively common,13
a legal mechanism is necessary to provide relief to employees who
reasonably and justifiably rely on their employers’ pension benefit
statements when those statements later turn out to be inaccurate.
This Note will discuss how such pension benefit disputes were
handled before ERISA, critique how federal courts have adjudicated
these disputes since ERISA, and propose a new, fairer ERISA equi-
table estoppel formula to provide relief to employees in situations
like that discussed above.14
Specifically, this Note will propose that federal courts should
permit ERISA equitable estoppel claims in which: (1) a representa-
tion of fact has been made with fraudulent intent or gross negli-
gence, (2) by a party who was aware or who should have been aware
of the true facts, (3) who intended to induce another’s reliance,
(4) where the other party was unaware of the true facts, and
(5) reasonably and justifiably relied on the representations to his
detriment.15
9. See infra Part III (discussing ERISA equitable estoppel formulas in most circuit
courts).
10. See infra note 122 (discussing why the other two available ERISA remedies do not
apply).
11. See, e.g., Livick v. Gillette Co., 524 F.3d 24, 26-27, 30-33 (1st Cir. 2008); Mello v. Sara
Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 442, 445-46 (5th Cir. 2005).
12. Jane D. Bailey, ERISA Preemption, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 474 (1997) (citing U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE-BASED HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND
CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 2 (1995)).
13. According to an audit published by the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, 13.7
percent of pension participants are being undercompensated based on the terms of their
pension plans. See Marcy Gordon, Pension Recipients Not Getting Full Benefits, FREE LANCE-
STAR, June 17, 1997, at B6; see also Press Release, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Pension
Plans: Standard Termination Audit Findings (June 16, 1997), available at http://www.pbgc.
gov/news/press/releases/pr97-31a.html.
14. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
15. This formula is loosely modeled after the Sixth Circuit’s ERISA estoppel formula, as
articulated in Smiljanich v. Gen. Motors Corp., 302 F. App’x 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2008).
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This Note will also propose a new formula for “gross negligence”
in the ERISA estoppel context that would not require the employee
to prove the employer’s intent to deceive the employee. The above
formula would be satisfied when an employer or pension adminis-
trator issues a written benefit statement that grossly overstates an
employee’s benefit and later reaffirms the employee’s overstated
benefit in written and oral correspondences with the employee.16
Finally, this Note argues that, contrary to their current positions,
courts should hold that it is not per se unreasonable for an employee
to rely on his employer’s or pension administrator’s representations
that—unknown to the employee—contradict the actual pension
terms if those representations are made in a written pension benefit
statement.17
I. BACKGROUND
Employee remedies in pension benefit disputes were not always
as limited as they are today.18 Over the last century, Congress and
the courts have steadily eroded employee remedies. Congress has
done its part by enacting tough antiworker rights laws.19 The courts
have done their part by interpreting workers’ recovery rights under
these laws even more narrowly than Congress intended.20
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See Kimberly A. Kralowec, Estoppel Claims Against ERISA Employee Benefit Plans,
25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 504-16 (1992) (discussing estoppel claims before ERISA).
19. See infra Part II.A (discussing the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA).
20. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 51, 53-54 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Taft-Hartley
provision that allows unions to collect dues from dissenting employees in Communications
Workers of America v. Beck was inconsistent with congressional intent and amounts to “a
significant drain on the resources of the American labor movement”); see also Aetna Health,
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court’s
interpretation of ERISA’s equitable relief provision as a “cramped construction”); Catherine
L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the
Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 38-39 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of ERISA’s preemption provision is contrary to congressional intent and
has had “disastrous effects” on employee rights). But see, e.g., Eric M. Jensen, The NLRA’s
“Guard Exclusion”: An Analysis of Section 9(b)(3)’s Legislative Intent and Modern Day
Applicability, 61 IND. L.J. 457, 472 n.94, 480-82 (1986) (arguing that courts have properly
interpreted congressional intent by broadly applying the Taft-Hartley Act amendments’
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A. Pension Benefit Disputes Under American Common Law
Before Congress and the courts began to limit employee remedies
through legislation and judicial interpretation, courts readily pro-
vided relief to employees who detrimentally relied on their employ-
ers’ pension benefit misrepresentations.21 The relief often came in
the form of either promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel.22 For
example, in Sessions v. Southern California Edison Co., a California
state court estopped an employer from denying that it owed a
pension to the plaintiff-employee who retired at age fifty-four even
though the actual pension plan terms required the employee to work
until age sixty to be eligible for a pension.23 The court applied the
doctrine of promissory estoppel after finding that the employer
incorrectly told the employee that it would disregard the age re-
quirement.24 Similarly, in Sanders v. United Distributors, Inc., a
Louisiana state court applied equitable estoppel to prevent an
employer from claiming that it owed the plaintiff-employee only a
$119 monthly benefit under the actual plan terms, instead of the
$284 monthly benefit that the employer had told the employee he
would receive upon early retirement.25
These two cases illustrate how courts previously used estoppel to
provide relief to employees in pension benefit disputes like the one
discussed in the introduction to this Note.26 As one author con-
cluded, “Estoppel remained an important theory of recovery ... until
Congress intervened.”27
B. Pension Benefit Disputes After the Taft-Hartley Act
In 1947, Congress slammed the brakes on employee rights in
pension benefit disputes. The Labor Management Relations Act,
“guard exclusion”).
21. Kralowec, supra note 18, at 492 (“[P]re-ERISA courts readily applied estoppel to
enforce misrepresentations about benefits.”). 
22. Id. at 504-05.
23. 118 P.2d 935, 936-37, 939-40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); see also Kralowec, supra note
18, at 515-16 (summarizing the Sessions holding).
24. Sessions, 118 P.2d at 939-40.
25. 405 So. 2d 536, 538-39 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
26. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
27. Kralowec, supra note 18, at 516.
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popularly known as the “Taft-Hartley Act,”28 was enacted over
President Harry Truman’s veto29 and constituted Congress’s most
significant attempt to regulate labor unions.30 The highly controver-
sial Act,31 which President Truman predicted would “adversely
affect our national unity,”32 requires employers and labor unions to
participate in collective bargaining to determine employee wages,
hours, and retirement benefits.33 The Act also requires the employer
and labor union to put their agreement in writing “if requested by
either party.”34 It was this “writing” provision that courts first used
to deny an employee’s estoppel claim against an employer who mis-
represented the employee’s pension benefits.35
In Thurber v. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Plan, for
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the plaintiff-employee’s estoppel claim against his pension adminis-
trator.36 The court found that permitting the estoppel claim, and
thereby allowing the employee to recover a pension not due under
the provisions of the pension plan, would violate the Taft-Hartley
Act’s requirement that pension payments be made according to the
pension plan’s written provisions.37 Similarly, in Guthart v. White,
28. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 191-197 (2006)).
29. See Veto of the Taft-Hartley Labor Bill, 1947 PUB. PAPERS 288 (June 20, 1947),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12675; see also Jay Walz, Labor Bill Is
Held Sure of Passage over Truman Veto, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1947, at A1.
30. See generally Steven E. Abraham, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Balance
of Power in Industrial Relations, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 341, 341-43 (1995) (discussing the impact
of the Taft-Hartley Act on employer-employee relationships).
31. William S. White, Truman Plea Fails, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1947, at A1 (noting the
dispute between the President and Congress).
32. Id. at A3. In addition to President Truman’s veto, several political organizations
labeled the Act a “slave labor law.” Leo Troy, Taft-Hartley After 50 Years, J. COM., Sept. 3,
1997, at 8A. In its statement on the Act, the National Executive Board of the Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) said, “[Congress] seek[s] to destroy labor unions, to degrade
living standards ... and forever to prevent the great mass of the people ... from shaking off this
yoke of want and repression.” Shannon Sheppard, Pamphlets in the Fight Against Taft-
Hartley 1947-1948, HOLT LAB. LIBR., http://www.holtlaborlibrary.org/tafthartley.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2012).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
34. Id. § 158(d).
35. Kralowec, supra note 18, at 518 (citing Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d 110, 117 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
36. 542 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1976).
37. Id.
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the Ninth Circuit denied an employee’s estoppel claim seeking
medical benefits that the pension administrator said he was eligible
for but to which he was not actually entitled under the written pro-
visions of the pension plan.38 The court held that “it would be illegal
for the fund to pay benefits” to the employee because doing so would
violate the Taft-Hartley Act’s writing requirement.39
As devastating as the Taft-Hartley Act was to employee remedies
in pension disputes, its reach was limited. The writing require-
ment, still in effect today, applies only to collectively bargained-for
pensions.40 Employees with pensions that were not collectively bar-
gained-for could still seek relief via estoppel for a few more years.41
II. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) OF
1974
A. Build Up to ERISA
Congress further limited employee rights in pension benefit
disputes when it enacted ERISA in 1974.42 To fully appreciate just
how adversely ERISA impacted employee rights in some instances,
and just how contrary that impact was to Congress’s intent when it
enacted ERISA, one first needs to understand the context in which
ERISA came to be.
In the late 1800s, employers first began implementing pension
plans as part of employee compensation packages.43 In their early
years, pensions were legally considered “gifts” and therefore went
38. 263 F.3d 1099, 1102-03, 1105 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. Id. at 1103. 
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006); see also Steven L. Brown, ERISA’s Preemption of
Estoppel Claims Relating to Benefit Plans, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1989) (explaining that
the Taft-Hartley Act “inadequately regulated employee benefit plans because it only applied
to pension trusts established through collective bargaining”); Kralowec, supra note 18, at 519
(explaining that the Act governs only collectively bargained-for plans).
41. Kralowec, supra note 18, at 519 (“Meanwhile, pre-ERISA courts continued to decide
estoppel claims against non-collectively-bargained plans.”).
42. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
43. PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 3443, SUMMARY
OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 1 (2009), available at
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/pension7.pdf. American Express was the first major company to
establish an employee pension benefit plan. Brown, supra note 40, at 1396.
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largely unregulated.44 If an employer or union underfunded its
pension fund or decided that the pension funds could be better used
for another purpose, the employer or union could reduce or even
terminate the pension plan with few legal consequences.45 In short,
“employees had no guarantee that employers would actually pay
pension benefits”46 if “the company became unprofitable or went out
of business.”47 Clearly, administration of pensions in these early
years produced grossly unfair results for the employees who counted
on the pensions for retirement income. It was not until World War
II that pensions became an issue of national importance.48
During World War II, Congress imposed limits on employee
wages in order to keep manufacturing costs down.49 In an effort to
navigate around these limitations, employers ramped up the use of
pensions as compensation for employees50 because pensions were
not subject to the wage controls.51 As a result, the number of pen-
sions boomed and continued to boom through the 1950s and 1960s.52
Still, most pensions went largely unregulated because only a frac-
tion of those pensions were collectively bargained-for and therefore
subject to Taft-Hartley.53 In 1963, things changed.
44. PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 1 (“[P]ensions were regarded as gifts in
recognition of long service rather than as a form of compensation protected by law.”);
Kralowec, supra note 18, at 505 (“The earliest pre-ERISA courts would not enforce employers’
benefit plan promises as contracts because they considered them gifts.”).
45. PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 1.
46. Brown, supra note 40, at 1392.
47. PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 1. 
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. Congress had a vested interest in depressing manufacturing costs because it
needed to efficiently manufacture the planes and weapons needed for a successful war effort.
Richard E. Schumann, Compensation from World War II Through the Great Society, BUREAU
OF LAB. STAT. (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030124ar04p1.htm.
50. Schumann, supra note 49; see also PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 2.
51. PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 2; Schumann, supra note 49.
52. PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 2 (“Both of these developments led to more
widespread adoption of employer-sponsored pensions during the 1950s and 1960s.”);
Schumann, supra note 49.
53. James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 686 (2011)
(“At the end of World War II about 20% of private-sector employees participated in a pension
plan. Only a fraction participated in a collectively bargained plan.”).
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In December 1963, the financially strained Studebaker-Packard
Corporation, which employed thousands of people,54 suddenly ter-
minated its pension program.55 Overnight, thousands of employees
lost the pensions they were promised and had earned.56 The story
made headlines, outraging employees and labor unions across the
country.57 Reacting to the public outrage, Congress began exploring
regulation of the rapidly growing and largely unregulated private
pension system.58 The result was ERISA. When Congress passed
ERISA nearly a year after the Studebaker failure, the bill explicitly
recognized that it was the rapid “growth in size, scope and numbers
of employee benefit plans” and the “lack of ... adequate safeguards”
that necessitated ERISA’s pension regulations.59
B. Overview of ERISA
Although enacted to protect workers, in practice ERISA actually
limits employee rights in some circumstances. To say that ERISA
sharply limits employee rights generally, however, would be woe-
fully simplistic and inaccurate. This Note makes a narrower asser-
tion: that ERISA—as currently interpreted by federal courts—
severely limits employee remedies in the event of a conflict between
the employee and his or her employer regarding the employee’s
pension.
54. PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 2 (discussing the “several thousand workers and
retirees” who lost their pensions due to the Studebaker collapse). 
55. Wooten, supra note 53, at 683-84 (“When Studebaker-Packard closed the facility in
December 1963 the pension plan for hourly workers did not have enough assets to meet its
obligations.”).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 684 (discussing the Studebaker pension failure as a “[f]ocusing event”). The
Studebaker pension failure was even referenced in Billy Joel’s chart-topping song “We Didn’t
Start the Fire,” which rhythmically listed major political and cultural events from the 1940s
through 1980s. See BILLY JOEL, We Didn’t Start the Fire, on STORM FRONT (Columbia Records
1989) (“Joe McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Studebaker, Television”).
58. PURCELL & STAMAN, supra note 43, at 2 (“After the Studebaker automobile company
terminated its underfunded pension plan ... Congress began considering legislation to ensure
the security of pension benefits in the private sector.”).
59. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 832 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(2006)).
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1. ERISA’s Employee Pension Protections
ERISA does provide a host of protections and safeguards for
employees and their pensions. Although an exhaustive review of
those protections and safeguards is not necessary for the purposes
of this Note, a brief overview is needed to illustrate the extra-
ordinary lengths to which Congress went to protect employees.
Congress’s efforts, in turn, illustrate that it enacted ERISA to
protect employees’ pension benefit expectations and not to sharply
limit employee remedies in pension disputes.60
ERISA protects employees in three basic ways. First, it imposes
on employers a variety of extensive reporting and disclosure re-
quirements to ensure that employees and pension beneficiaries are
fully informed about the plan and their benefits.61 To this end,
ERISA requires employers to regularly issue to employees summary
plan descriptions that detail in plain language the plan terms and
benefits.62 If an employer wants to make any material modifications
to the pension plan, ERISA requires the employer to notify affected
employees in writing.63
Second, ERISA regulates pension eligibility and benefit accrual.64
If an employer wants to require an employee to work for the em-
ployer for a certain period of time before becoming eligible for pen-
sion benefits, the employer must do so in compliance with ERISA’s
strict limitations.65 Similarly, ERISA regulates the rate at which
employees earn benefits once they are actually eligible to participate
in the pension plan.66
60. See Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives No
Longer Pertain: “Right Sizing” and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 276, 276 (2000)
(“ERISA’s ostensible and articulated purpose is to protect employees’ expectations of receiving
such benefits when they need them.”); James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History
of ERISA, Preemption (pt. 1), 14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 31, 32 (2006) (“In passing ERISA,
Congress meant to make security of pension promises a basic goal of federal policy.”).
61. See ERISA § 101(a).
62. See id. § 101(a)(1).
63. See id. § 102(a)(2).
64. See id. § 202(a)(1)(A) (regulating employer limits on pension eligibility); id. § 204
(regulating pension benefit accrual).
65. See id. § 202(a)(1)(A).
66. See id. § 204. 
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Finally, ERISA imposes strict pension funding requirements on
employers to ensure that pension funds actually have enough money
to pay out the benefits promised to employees.67 Together, these
regulations demonstrate that Congress intended ERISA to protect
employees’ pension benefit expectations and did not intend to pre-
clude employees from seeking meaningful relief when wronged by
their employers. 
2. Employee Remedies Under ERISA
ERISA’s pension regulations provide meaningful assurance to
employees and beneficiaries that the benefits they have been
promised will actually be there when they retire. It is the relatively
rare instance when those benefits are denied that ERISA falls short.
Section 502(a) is ERISA’s “civil enforcement” section, providing
remedies for violations of ERISA’s regulations.68 There are three
subsections under section 502(a) that govern virtually all ERISA
claims.69 Under section 502(a)(1)(A), pension participants and bene-
ficiaries may sue pension administrators who fail to provide the
required disclosures about their pension.70 If the claim is successful,
the pension administrator must provide the required information
and may be subject to a $100 per day fine.71 Under section
502(a)(1)(B), pension participants and beneficiaries may sue for
benefits due under the pension plan terms, plus attorney’s fees.72 Of
course, this section does not provide relief to employees who detri-
mentally relied on their employer’s inaccurate pension benefit
statement.73 Finally, and most importantly, under section 502(a)(3),
employees and beneficiaries may “enjoin any act or practice which
67. See id. §§ 302-304.
68. See id. § 502(a).
69. See id.; see also Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith:
Losing Sight of the Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387, 393 (2009) (“[S]ubsections
(1)-(3) ... constitute the three remedy provisions upon which virtually all claims by ERISA
participants and beneficiaries are brought.”).
70. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A).
71. Id. § 502(c)(i).
72. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B)(g).
73. This is because summary plan descriptions are not the actual terms of the plan. See
Cigna v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1877 (2011) (dismissing a 502(a)(1)(B) claim because the
summary plan description was not the actual pension plan).
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violates any [ERISA] provision ... or the terms of the [pension] plan,
or ... obtain other appropriate equitable relief.”74
The last section regarding “other appropriate equitable relief” is
of paramount importance because ERISA preempts all state law
causes of action, including all contract and tort causes of action, that
“relate to” the pension benefit plan.75 Likewise, unless an employee’s
claims fall within the narrow confines of section 502(a)(1)(A), the
employee’s claims are at the mercy of the courts’ interpretation of
the phrase “other appropriate equitable relief.”76 The meaning of
this phrase is a subject of considerable debate.77 One of the contro-
versial issues is whether “other appropriate equitable relief” in-
cludes equitable estoppel.78 Circuit courts were split on this issue.79
In May 2011, the Supreme Court in Cigna Corp. v. Amara held that
under ERISA section 502(a)(3)—the “other appropriate equitable
relief” provision—courts could utilize equitable remedies, including
reformation, prevention of unjust enrichment, and equitable
estoppel to remedy a pension administrator’s ERISA violations.80
74. ERISA § 502(a)(3).
75. Id. §§ 502(a), 514(a).
76. The employee may not seek relief under any other state or federal law because
ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies are the exclusive remedies for claims that relate to
ERISA benefit plans. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (stating that
ERISA’s preemption provision expresses Congress’s intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement
remedies be the exclusive remedies available for ERISA claims).
77. See, e.g., Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants’ Rights
by Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671 (1994) (arguing that
the “other appropriate equitable relief” provision should be broadly interpreted to expand
employee remedies). But see, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1993)
(holding that “other appropriate equitable relief” is limited, not to “whatever relief a court of
equity is empowered to provide,” but to the “categories of relief that were typically available
in equity”).
78. Some commentators and courts have suggested that equitable estoppel is consistent
with ERISA’s “other equitable relief” provision. See, e.g., Util. Workers, Local 369 v. NSTAR
Electric & Gas Co., 317 F. Supp. 2d 69, 72 (D. Mass. 2004) (“An ERISA estoppel claim arises
under the federal common law and is considered a form of ‘appropriate equitable relief ’ that
is available under Section 1132(a)(3).”). Other courts strongly disagree. See, e.g., Nachwalter
v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1986) (dismissing plaintiff’s ERISA equitable estoppel
claim as inconsistent with ERISA’s writing requirement).
79. Compare, e.g., Smiljanich v. Gen. Motors Corp., 302 F. App’x 443, 451 (6th Cir. 2008)
(permitting an ERISA estoppel claim), with Law v. Ernst & Young, 956 F.2d 364, 367-68 (1st
Cir. 1992) (denying that equitable estoppel is an actionable claim under ERISA).
80. 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1879-81 (2011).
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The Cigna decision was a victory for employees, but it left many
issues unaddressed. Although equitable estoppel is now a cause of
action under ERISA, it is still not clear how to formulate an ERISA
equitable estoppel claim or under what factual circumstances it
might be permitted. The Supreme Court did not address these
issues in Cigna,81 so it is up to the lower federal courts to develop a
federal common law of ERISA estoppel.82 That task may prove to be
divisive.
III. CRITIQUE OF PRE-CIGNA CIRCUIT COURT ERISA ESTOPPEL
FORMULAS
When post-Cigna federal circuit courts of appeals begin to
consider ERISA equitable estoppel cases, they will be charged with
developing an ERISA estoppel formula that is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Cigna. Naturally, they will look for
guidance from pre-Cigna circuit court decisions that permitted equi-
table estoppel. Post-Cigna courts should be wary of these decisions,
however, because the ERISA estoppel formulas from these pre-
Cigna decisions are too narrow and do not provide relief to employ-
ees in pension benefit disputes like the one described in the
introduction to this Note.83
Prior to Cigna, the circuit courts that permitted ERISA equitable
estoppel claims used some variation of the following formula,
permitting a claim only when (1) a representation of fact was made
with fraudulent intent, (2) by a party aware of the true facts,
(3) intending to induce the other party’s reliance, (4) and the other
party, unaware of the true facts, (5) reasonably or justifiably relied
on the representation to his detriment.84
81. See id.
82. Congress intended the courts to further develop a federal common law of equitable
remedies. Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 220 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2000).
83. See, e.g., Livick v. Gillette Co., 524 F.3d 24, 30-32 (1st Cir. 2008) (denying estoppel
recovery to employee who detrimentally relied on his pension administrator’s statements that
conflicted with the unambiguous terms of the actual plan).
84. See Smiljanich, 302 F. App’x at 448; see also 43 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts § 261(B)(8)
(2011) (discussing the elements of federal common law equitable estoppel).
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A. “Ambiguous” Provision Limitation
Circuit courts further narrowed this formula by limiting ERISA
equitable estoppel to cases in which the pension plan itself was
ambiguous.85 In short, these courts held that a written pension
benefit statement could not alter the terms of the actual plan but
could bind the pension administrator through estoppel if the state-
ment was an interpretation of an ambiguous provision in the actual
plan.86 In Cigna, the Supreme Court seemed to reject this limitation
when it held that, although a pension administrator’s statements
about an unambiguous provision of the plan cannot alter the pen-
sion plan itself, the statements can be used as the basis for estoppel
should the pension participant seek to estop the administrator from
claiming that it properly denied benefits under the pension plan.87
For this reason, post-Cigna courts are unlikely to require ambiguity
in the actual pension plan as a prerequisite for estoppel claims.
Therefore, post-Cigna courts should adopt an equitable estoppel
formula similar to that proposed below,88 one that permits estoppel
claims regardless of whether the pension plan was ambiguous.
B. “Extraordinary Circumstances” Limitation
The far bigger problem with these pre-Cigna circuit court formu-
lations is another limitation they imposed on ERISA equitable
estoppel claims. In addition to the formula above, every circuit that
permitted ERISA estoppel before Cigna also added the element of
“extraordinary circumstances.”89 As one circuit court said, “[A] plain-
85. See 43 AM. JUR., supra note 84, § 261(B)(19) (“Under the prevailing rule, an estoppel
claim cannot be successfully brought where the misrepresentation at issue conflicts with a
clear and unambiguous term of the ... policy.”).
86. See id. § 261(B)(20) (“An employer or insurer can be estopped as a consequence of
interpretations made of ambiguous provisions.... [But i]f the plain language is clear ... the oral
representation will be ... unenforceable.”). 
87. See Cigna Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1879-91 (2011).
88. See infra Part V.
89. See Kerber v. Qwest Grp. Life Ins. Plan, 647 F.3d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 2011);
Smiljanich, 302 F. App’x at 448; Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2005);
Coker v. Trans World Airlines, 165 F.3d 579, 585-86 (7th Cir. 1999); Curcio v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 1994); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d
Cir. 1993); Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Andrus, 498 F. Supp. 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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tiff must do more than merely make out the ‘ordinary elements’ of
equitable estoppel to establish a claim for equitable estoppel under
ERISA”; he or she must also prove the existence of “extraordinary
circumstances.”90 Although circuit courts have never provided a
single controlling definition,91 it is clear that “extraordinary circum-
stances” means that the plan administrators either engaged in
fraud or intended to deceive the employee.92
The courts’ justification for limiting estoppel recovery to claims
involving extraordinary circumstances was based on concern for the
financial health of pension funds.93 The basic argument was that if
courts required pension funds to pay benefits to an employee who
was not entitled to those benefits, the fund would not have enough
money to pay benefits to employees who were actually entitled to
benefits.94 Thus, the solvency of the fund trumped an employee’s
claim for relief.95
Admittedly, this justification makes some sense when the plain-
tiff employee is suing the pension fund. In that situation, the
employee’s recovery would be taken directly from the pension
monies otherwise used to compensate his or her fellow employees.
This justification makes little sense, however, when the plaintiff-
employee sues his employer instead of the pension fund. In that
case, the employee’s recovery would be taken from the employer
rather than the fund. If the plaintiff ’s recovery does not come
90. Kurz v. Phila. Electric Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1553 (3d Cir. 1996). 
91. Id. (“We have never clearly defined ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ relying instead on
case law to establish its parameters.”).
92. See Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Emps. of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research
Found., 334 F.3d 365, 383 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[E]xtraordinary circumstances generally involve
acts of bad faith on the part of the employer, attempts to actively conceal a significant change
in the plan, or commission of fraud.”).
93. See Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The actuarial soundness
of pension funds is, absent extraordinary circumstances, too important to permit trustees to
obligate the fund to pay pensions to persons not entitled to them under the express terms of
the pension plan.”).
94. See Haeberle v. Bd. of Trs. of Buffalo Carpenters Health-Care Funds, 624 F.2d 1132,
1139 (2d Cir. 1980).
95. See, e.g., Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677, 686 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying plaintiff-
employees’ ERISA estoppel claim in order to protect the pension fund’s actuarial soundness,
even though “[the court] sympathiz[ed] with plaintiffs’ views that, after long years of faithful
service with the Company which was concluded through no fault of their own, they ought to
receive some pension benefits”). 
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from the pension fund, it does not adversely impact the fund’s
actuarial soundness. Likewise, at least in cases in which the
plaintiff-employee is suing his employer, there is no justification for
requiring “extraordinary circumstances.” Post-Cigna courts should
therefore adopt an ERISA equitable estoppel formula similar to the
one proposed below that abandons the “extraordinary circum-
stances” limitation.96
The “extraordinary circumstances” limitation is flawed for two
additional reasons. First, it is not consistent with traditional equi-
table estoppel formulas or the policies that underlie the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. Second, the “extraordinary circumstances” limi-
tation is not consistent with Congress’s express purpose for enacting
ERISA.
1.“Extraordinary Circumstances” Limitation Not Consistent
with Traditional Notions of Equitable Estoppel
As discussed above, the “extraordinary circumstances” required
for an ERISA equitable estoppel claim arose only when the em-
ployer or pension administrators engaged in fraud or intended to
deceive the employee.97 With only one exception,98 no pre-Cigna
circuit court permitted ERISA equitable estoppel claims based on an
employer’s gross negligence in administering a pension. Such a
narrow formula is inconsistent with traditional formulas of equi-
table estoppel and also undermines the justifications for using
equitable estoppel.
Outside the ERISA context, case law demonstrates that an
equitable estoppel claim may be predicated upon a plaintiff’s
showing that the defendant either engaged in fraud, intended to
deceive the plaintiff, or acted in such a grossly negligent manner
toward the plaintiff that his or her actions constituted “constructive
fraud.” In In re Maxwell, for example, a federal district court in
Illinois held that “[p]roof of fraudulent intent is not always neces-
sary to invoke the estoppel doctrine.”99 Similarly, in Albanese v. WCI
96. See infra Part V.
97. See Burstein, 334 F.3d at 383.
98. See Bloemker v. Laborers’ Local 265 Pension Fund, 605 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2010).
99. 40 B.R. 231, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
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Communities, Inc., a federal district court in Virginia held that “it
is not necessary to show actual fraud” to establish equitable
estoppel.100 Indeed, even the Supreme Court has supported this
view. In Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., the Court held that
“gross negligence ... [so] as to amount to constructive fraud” is
sufficient to establish an equitable estoppel claim.101 Because gross
negligence is so widely accepted as a basis for establishing equitable
estoppel in other contexts, it is hard to understand why nearly every
pre-Cigna circuit court required more than gross negligence.
A thorough review of case law from these circuit courts does not
reveal a direct answer. The circuit courts simply required “fraud” or
“intent to deceive” and made no reference at all to “gross negli-
gence.”102 Although the justification may not have been expressly
stated in these opinions, the crux of the justification was clear: the
actuarial soundness of the pension fund is too important to permit
estoppel claims that would drain the fund except in cases in which
the employer or pension administrator acted in bad faith.103 Of
course, gross negligence does not require malice or bad faith.104
Gross negligence is not premised on the mindset of the defendant
but upon the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions.105 An
employer’s innocent actions, no matter how negligent, are not
sufficiently “extraordinary” to justify jeopardizing the actuarial
soundness of the pension fund.
A more compelling argument can be made that permitting equi-
table estoppel claims based on gross negligence will actually better
protect the actuarial soundness of the pension fund. Permitting
claims based upon gross negligence will incentivize the employer or
pension administrator to take special care in dealing with pen-
sions.106 This, in turn, will ensure that employers and pension
100. 530 F. Supp. 2d 752, 766 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing Nargi v. CaMac Corp., 820 F. Supp.
253, 256 (W.D. Va. 1992)).
101. 93 U.S. 326, 335 (1876).
102. See, e.g., supra note 89 (listing circuit courts that permit ERISA equitable estoppel
under “extraordinary circumstances”).
103. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing actuarial soundness of the
pension fund as the reason courts required “extraordinary circumstances” in ERISA equitable
estoppel cases).
104. JACOB A. STEIN, 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 4:11 (3d ed. 2012).
105. Id.
106. This is because failure to do so could lead to liability via an ERISA estoppel claim.
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administrators are not overpaying pensions, thereby protecting the
pension fund’s assets.107 Moreover, if employers and pension
administrators take better care to ensure that they are not overesti-
mating an employee’s potential monthly benefit in a pension benefit
statement, fewer employees will likely choose early retirement
based on faulty, overstated estimates. These employees will con-
tinue working and contributing to the pension fund, thereby
increasing the fund’s assets and reducing the number of years that
the fund will pay out benefits once the employee retires. For these
reasons, permitting equitable estoppel claims based on gross negli-
gence could actually better protect the actuarial soundness of the
pension fund. In contrast, artificially narrowing the cases in which
an equitable estoppel claim may be brought is unlikely to bring the
same benefit.
Requiring more than gross negligence to establish an equitable
estoppel claim is more than just bad policy; it is also contrary to the
very principles that support the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the
first place. The founding principle of equitable estoppel is that “he
who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would
not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or
injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.”108
Without “gross negligence,” the conduct of the offending party is
irrelevant. The issue is simply whether the offending party acted in
bad faith. Without a gross negligence standard, employee expecta-
tions will frequently be disappointed. Likewise, any ERISA equi-
table estoppel formula that does not encompass gross negligence
undermines the foundational principles of equitable estoppel. Post-
Cigna courts should therefore adopt an equitable estoppel formula
like the one proposed below that permits claims when the employer
or pension administrator acted in a grossly negligent manner.109
107. If an employer or pension administrator overpays pension benefits, it is difficult to
recoup those overpayments. See 8 WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 10499 (3d ed.
2011) (“Overpayment of benefits is a relatively common problem with qualified plans.
Recovering the overpayment may be difficult.”).
108. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879) (emphasis added).
109. See infra Part V.
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2. “Extraordinary Circumstances” Limitation Not Consistent
with Congress’s Purpose in Enacting ERISA
The “extraordinary circumstances” limitation on ERISA equitable
estoppel claims is also inconsistent with congressional intent.
Congress enacted ERISA in large part to protect employees’ expec-
tations about future pension benefits.110 Requiring “extraordinary
circumstances” undermines this intent in at least three ways.
First, if an employee reasonably expects to receive a certain
benefit based on his employer’s pension benefit statement, it does
not make sense that the employee’s chances of recovery depend
upon the mindset of his employer or pension administrator when it
issued the inaccurate statement. Although one could argue that
permitting estoppel in a wider variety of cases would undermine the
expectations of other employees whose pension benefits could be
compromised if the fund went into the red, this would not neces-
sarily be the result.111 Regardless, undermining employees’ benefit
expectations by artificially limiting estoppel to cases involving fraud
and intentional deception is contrary to Congress’s goal of protecting
those employees’ benefit expectations.
Second, requiring “extraordinary circumstances,” defined as
“fraud” or “intent to deceive,” to establish an ERISA equitable estop-
pel claim undermines Congress’s stated goal of “providing ... ready
access to the [ ] courts.”112 Pleading “fraud” or “intent to deceive” is
exceptionally difficult,113 even more so after the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly114 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.115 In those cases, the Court held that a plaintiff must plead
facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.116 If the plaintiff
fails to do so, the judge must dismiss the claim.117 This imposes a
110. See Schmall, supra note 60, at 276.
111. See infra Part V (discussing how permitting gross negligence claims could protect the
actuarial soundness of the pension fund).
112. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
113. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1300 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the heightened pleading standard for fraud claims).
114. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
115. 556 U.S. 662 (2008).
116. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
117. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570.
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heavy burden on plaintiffs alleging fraud or intent to deceive
because proving the defendant’s mindset is very challenging to do
without discovery.118 Requiring an employee to plead fraud or intent
to deceive can hardly be said to provide that employee with ready
access to the courts. Permitting claims based on gross negligence, on
the other hand, would further Congress’s goal of providing ready
access to the courts. Because gross negligence is concerned with the
defendant’s conduct, which may be evidenced by documents like
pension benefit statements that are in the plaintiff ’s possession,119
the plaintiff could much more easily plead facts sufficient to proceed
past a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.120
The third reason that the “extraordinary circumstances” limi-
tation is contrary to Congress’s intent is that it undermines
Congress’s desire to provide employees with “appropriate remedies”
when the employer or pension administrator violates ERISA’s regu-
latory provisions.121 By foreclosing estoppel claims premised on
“gross negligence,” courts essentially foreclose on those employees’
only potential claims.122
It is for these reasons that limiting ERISA equitable estoppel
claims to cases involving “fraud” or “intent to deceive” is contrary to
Congress’s intent when it enacted ERISA.
118. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 608 (2002) (“Facts
supporting allegations of the state of mind of a defendant are often peculiarly in the hands
of the defendant. Pleading with particularity is difficult, if not impossible, without dis-
covery.”).
119. A summary plan description, which is prepared by the employer or pension
administrator, could evidence gross negligence if it contradicts the terms of the pension plan.
See supra text accompanying note 62.
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see also 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 307 (2012).
121. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
122. The other two civil enforcement remedies do not apply in this situation. ERISA section
502(a)(1)(A) does not apply because the employee would not be seeking disclosure of certain
documents, and section 502(a)(1)(B) does not apply because the employee would not be
seeking benefits due under the terms of the plan. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying
text.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S PRE-CIGNA ERISA
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL FORMULA
As previously noted, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the
only pre-Cigna circuit court that permitted ERISA equitable
estoppel claims founded on an employer’s or pension administrator’s
gross negligence.123 For two reasons, however, the Sixth Circuit still
denied pre-Cigna ERISA equitable estoppel claims with facts simi-
lar to those presented in the introduction.124 If post-Cigna circuit
courts are to provide remedies to employees who, to their detriment,
reasonably relied on their employers’ representations about pension
benefits, these courts must reverse course.
A. Sixth Circuit’s “Reasonableness” Definition Is Not Reasonable
The first problem with the Sixth Circuit’s pre-Cigna ERISA
equitable estoppel formula is its understanding of “reasonableness.”
Of course, an estoppel claim arises only if the plaintiff ’s reliance on
the defendant’s misrepresentations was “reasonable.”125 In the
ERISA context, the Sixth Circuit held that it is almost per se unrea-
sonable for an employee to rely on his or her employer’s or pension
administrator’s statements in a pension benefit statement if those
statements contradict the actual terms of the plan.126 Courts that
use this reasoning argue that a reasonable employee would have
verified the accuracy of the pension benefit statement by calculating
benefit eligibility on his or her own using the actual terms of the
pension plan.127 It would be unreasonable, these courts assert, for an
123. See, e.g., Smiljanich v. Gen. Motors Corp., 302 F. App’x 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2008).
124. See, e.g., Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[E]stoppel
can only be invoked in the context of ambiguous plan provisions.”).
125. See 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 8:3 (4th ed. 2008).
126. See, e.g., Sprague, 133 F.3d at 404 (“[R]eliance can seldom, if ever, be reasonable or
justifiable if it is inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous terms of plan documents
available to or furnished to the party.”). 
127. See Availability of Estoppel for ERISA Benefit Claims, in RIA PENSION BENEFITS
LIBRARY PENSION ANALYSIS 76,017.3 at 2 (2011).
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employee to simply rely on his or her employer’s statements about
the plan.128
The Sixth Circuit’s understanding of “reasonableness” may have
intellectual merit, but it fails in practice. It is not reasonable to
expect employees to be able to accurately calculate their pension
benefit eligibility on their own. The pension benefit calculation is
often extraordinarily complex.129 The plan itself can be up to one
hundred pages long, and there are countless factors that can fur-
ther complicate the calculation:130 mergers, promotions, demotions,
starting salary, ending salary, start date of employment, end date
of employment, length of employment, breaks in employment, early
retirement, late retirement; the list goes on and on.131 Further, when
the employer issues one plan document whose terms govern the
pensions of every employee, one cannot reasonably expect each
individual employee to be able to navigate this complex calculation
on his or her own.
It is far more reasonable for an employee to seek out the em-
ployer’s or pension administrator’s calculation. Pension administra-
tors are experts in the pension system, and they have the ability
and resources to calculate benefits more quickly and accurately.
After all, it is what they get paid to do.132 Admittedly, a reasonable
employee would not rely on a single pension benefit statement
before making a decision about retirement. Employers and pension
administrators are prone to human error, and a reasonable em-
ployee would verify the benefit statement before making a life-
changing decision. A reasonable employee would ask his or her
employer or pension administrator to verify the benefit statement
and only upon verification would a reasonable employee make a
decision in reliance on the employer’s calculation.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. “Following the Terms of the Plan”: What Does It Mean? What if You Don’t?, STROMATA,
http://stromata.tripod.com/id153.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).
131. See generally AM.ACAD. OF ACTUARIES,FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRENT PENSION FUNDING
AND ACCOUNTING FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PENSION PLANS 3-4, 6 (2004), available at
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/fundamentals_0704.pdf.
132. See PA. MUN. RET. SYS., EVALUATING YOUR PENSION PLAN (2010), available at
http://www.pmrs.state.pa.us/pensions/PenPlanBroch.pdf.
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Given the complexity of the pension benefits calculation, it is
baffling that courts have denied claims in which the employer
verified its original benefits calculation, orally and in writing, and
on multiple occasions, spanning a significant period of time.133 If an
employee’s reliance in those circumstances is not reasonable, it is
not clear how an employee could ever reasonably rely on his or her
employer’s statements about pension benefits. Therefore, when post-
Cigna circuit courts address the issue of “reasonableness,” they
should recognize the complexity of the calculation from an em-
ployee’s perspective and hold, as articulated in the proposal below,
that an employee acts reasonably when he or she relies on a pension
benefit statement that his or her employer verified on at least one
separate occasion.134
B. Sixth Circuit’s Formula Leaves “Gross Negligence” Undefined
The second problem with the Sixth Circuit’s pre-Cigna ERISA
equitable estoppel formula is the Court’s failure to provide a con-
crete definition for gross negligence. Outside of the ERISA context,
courts have developed a variety of definitions. In some courts, gross
negligence is a very high bar. For example, one court held that gross
negligence is “an entire, utter, complete, or extreme lack of care.”135
Another court required a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s gross
negligence by establishing “intentional, conscious failure.”136 And
yet another court held that gross negligence is not present “if the
defendant exercised some degree of care.”137 Compare these defini-
tions with those established by other courts that have developed a
much lower bar for proving “gross negligence.” For example, one
court defined gross negligence as “[an] act or omission ... of an
aggravated character.”138 Another court defined it as simply “a
133. See, e.g., Livick v. Gillette Co., 524 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing the
employer’s “repeated mistaken estimates”).
134. See infra Part V.
135. Mullins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 697 So. 2d 750, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Steinke v. S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 520 S.E.2d 142, 153 (S.C.
1999).
137. Whitley v. Commonwealth, 538 S.E.2d 296, 300 (Va. 2000).
138. Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998).
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greater lack of care than in the case of ‘ordinary negligence.’”139
Leaving “gross negligence” undefined in the ERISA equitable
estoppel context opens the door to any number of definitions and
would lead to inconsistent outcomes.
How courts ultimately define “gross negligence” will have an
important impact on ERISA equitable estoppel claims. If courts
require proof of “intentional, conscious failure,” employees will have
the same procedural difficulties proving gross negligence as they
have proving fraud.140 Similarly, if courts deny estoppel claims
merely because the employer “exercised some degree of care,”
employee claims are likely to fail. Employers could simply respond
that they exercised “some” care just by preparing a pension benefit
statement in the first place. If courts are to give “gross negligence”
any meaning in the ERISA equitable estoppel context, they must
define it in a manner that does not require a plaintiff to prove the
employer’s intent or let the employer off simply by proving that it
used some woefully inadequate degree of care. 
V. PROPOSED ERISA EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL FORMULA
The analysis above demonstrates the flaws in pre-Cigna circuit
courts’ approaches to ERISA equitable estoppel. With the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cigna, however, circuit courts will have an
opportunity to correct their flawed approaches. This Note proposes
that these post-Cigna courts do so by adopting the following ERISA
equitable estoppel formula:
ERISA equitable estoppel is permitted when (1) a representation
of fact is made with fraudulent intent or gross negligence, (2) by
a party who was aware, or who should have been aware, of the
true facts, (3) who intended to induce another’s reliance,
(4) where the other party was unaware of the true facts, and
(5) reasonably and justifiably relied on the representations to his
detriment.141
139. Higgins v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 702 N.Y.S.2d 502, 506 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1999).
140. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
141. This formula is loosely modeled after the Sixth Circuit’s ERISA estoppel formula, as
articulated in Smiljanich v. General Motors Corp., 302 F. App’x 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2008).
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This Note also proposes that courts adopt a definition for gross
negligence that does not require a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s
malicious intent to deceive the employee. Whatever precise defi-
nition the courts ultimately adopt, “gross negligence” should be
found when an employer or pension administrator issues a written
benefit statement that vastly overstates an employee’s benefit and
later reaffirms the employee’s overstated benefit in correspondences
with the employee.
Finally, this Note proposes that post-Cigna courts adopt a more
realistic approach to the “reasonableness” requirement. Courts
should find that it is not per se unreasonable for an employee to rely
on his or her employer’s or pension administrator’s representations,
provided those representations are made in a pension benefit state-
ment and are later confirmed by the employer or pension adminis-
trator in subsequent communications with the employee.
By adopting these recommendations, which address the shortcom-
ings of pre-Cigna formulas, courts would establish a new, fairer
approach to ERISA equitable estoppel. This new approach would
provide relief to employees who reasonably rely on their employers’
or pension administrators’ inaccurate statements about pension
benefits. It may even protect the actuarial soundness of the pension
plan for future employees. This new approach would also be more
consistent with Congress’s intent when it enacted ERISA because
it protects employees’ expectations about pension benefits142 and
provides employees “ready access to the ... courts” when those expec-
tations are disappointed.143 Finally, this approach would work in
practice. It does not impose unrealistic expectations on either the
employee or the employer. It simply requires both parties to use
reasonable care.
142. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
143. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
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CONCLUSION
In 1879, the Supreme Court said: “[H]e who by his language or
conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done,
shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the
expectations upon which he acted.”144 Nearly a century and a half
later, circuit courts must now decide whether that statement still
has meaning in the employment benefits context. By adopting the
proposed approach to ERISA equitable estoppel, circuit courts could
restore meaning to that statement again. In doing so, courts would
protect the legions of employees who have dedicated their lives to
their work on the promise that they will one day reap the benefits
of a retirement pension.
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